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Abstract
Deviations from standard game theoretical predictions have been
repeatedly observed in basic Dictator Games. Different interpreta-
tions have been provided to these deviations. On the one hand, em-
pirical (among others, Forsythe et al., 1994) and theoretical works
(among others, Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999)
have adopted the explanation based on other-regarding concerns. On
the other hand, potential weaknesses in standard design of the game
have been stressed. Evidence collected shows that when controlling
for reputation considerations (Hoffman et al., 1996) and for legitimacy
of assets (Cherry et al., 2002) behavior observed in the experiments is
very close to that predicted by standard game theory. Results from our
experiment suggest that the relevance of these two factors in explain-
ing observed behavior may be overestimated by previous contributions.
Relevant deviations from selfish equilibrium are registered in a condi-
tion of full-anonymity when assets to be shared are earned by the
dictators and, simultaneously, recipients are allowed to work without
being rewarded for their effort.
∗CEEL, University of Trento, Italy
†corresponding author, e-mail address: mploner@economia.unitn.it
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1 Introduction
A large body of experimental economics literature has dealt with simple
two-party bargaining situations. Among the most investigated settings there
are the Ultimatum Game (Gu¨th et al., 1982) (UG) and the Dictator Game
(Kahneman et al., 1986) (DG). Both these games mimic a situation where
an agent (the proposer) offers some part of a common amount of money
to another agent (the recipient). The difference between the two games
is that in the UG the recipient can refuse the offer made by the proposer
(and in this case both them lose the money) while in the DG the recipient
cannot refuse. In the Ultimatum game the subgame perfect solution is the
smallest possible offer submitted by the proposer and acceptance of the offer
on the part of the recipient. Similarly, in a Dictator Game, the standard
solution is a zero amount sent by the dictator. However, evidence from
experimental observations (for a review see, Camerer, 2003) is not in line
with the standard rational selfish solution of these simple bargaining games.
On average Proposers are willing to offer about 30−40% of their endowment
and offers below 20% of the endowment are often rejected. In the Dictator
Game Forsythe et al. (1994) found that dictators offer about 20% of the
resources they control to their partners. When jointly considered evidence
from the UG and the DG suggests that behavior in simple bargaining is
not only driven by strategic concerns but also by fairness. Other-regarding
concerns in the form of fairness are also the key feature of recent models
of social preferences (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
In particular, Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) claim that their model has a
comparative advantage with respect to other models of social preferences1
and when called to explain data from the dictator game which, according to
the authors “is basic to an understanding of many other games”.
The work of Hoffman et al. (1994) challenges the fairness explanation
provided to behavior observed in the Dictator Game. The paper shows
that the introduction of full-anonymity in choices (i.e., anonymity towards
other players and the experimenter) strongly decreases the amount given
in a Dictator Game. From this the authors conclude that “other-regarding
preferences may have an overwhelming social, what-do-others-know, com-
ponent, and therefore should be derived formally from more elementary
expectational considerations”. From a methodological point of view, the
authors strongly suggest a strict adherence to double blind procedures in
experiments in order to avoid a loss of control due to concerns for social
evaluations. In the same spirit of the paper of Hoffman et al. is the work
of Cherry et al. (2002). Main concern of the authors with previous exper-
imental studies on bargaining is the fact that these works do not address
1The authors explicitly compare predictions of their model with predictions made by
models proposed by Rabin (1993) and Levine (1998).
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the issue of wealth legitimacy. Indeed, it is a common practice in experi-
mental games to provide players with windfall money. The authors notice
that this practice is very poor in terms of realism and might affect exter-
nal validity of experimental results. According to the authors “the assets
in a bargaining must be legitimate to produce rational behavior”. In order
for assets to be legitimate they should be earned through the provision of
some effort. In the experiment proposed assets are earned by answering to
a questionnaire. What emerges from the dictator game interaction is that
other-regarding behavior strongly decreases in the population of Dictators
when bargaining takes place over earned wealth and almost disappears when
complete anonymity together with legitimacy of wealth is introduced in the
experimental design.
A different perspective on the relationship between effort and fairness
is presented by Ruﬄe (1998). In the variation to the standard DG consid-
ered the size of the pie to be shared is determined by the performance of
the Recipient in a general knowledge and skill-testing contest. What the
author founds is that Dictators tend to reward Recipients who performed
good but punish only modestly those who performed bad. According to the
author this is due to the fact that some Dictators believe that effort should
be rewarded even if it leads to a sub-optimal result. The contribution of
Eckel and Grossman (1996) is also focused on the “deservingness” of recipi-
ents but the characteristics of the counterpart are exogenously defined with
respect to the experiment. The authors found that even when double-blind
anonymity is enforced the fact that the recipient is a “reputable charity”
(i.e., American Red Cross) decreases the number of zero offers and deter-
mines an increase in the amount donated on average. On the relationship
between characteristics of the counterpart and offers, Ben-Ner et al. (2004)
register how differences in personality, cognitive ability and gender of the
Dictator and the Recipient affect behavior in the game. For what concerns
social distance Bohnet and Frey (1999) show that the higher the identifica-
tion between the two parties in the game the higher the amount offered.
The brief literature review reported above highlights the different ap-
proaches undertaken when considering behavior in a simple unilateral giving
context. Some authors regard the DG as a tool to investigate on the pre-
dictive robustness of game theory, while others prefer to rely on this simple
interaction structure to investigate on the role plaid by factors in some way
related to the social environment. Main difference between these two lines of
interpretation regards the inclusion/exclusion from the experimental design
of any element which could alter observed behaviors because of some social
factor. In other words, main concern of those who are mainly interested in
validating the forecasting power of standard game theory is to reproduce in
the laboratory the ideal pure scheme of choice implicitly assumed by game
theory. On the other hand, those who are interested to explore the socio-
psychological mechanisms which fuel the observed behaviors have designed
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experimental contexts able to take care for socio-psychological mechanisms.
The contribution of Cherry et al. (2002) simultaneously focuses on the is-
sue of anonymity, which is a major concern for those aiming at replicate a
game-theory setting, and concerns of realism about the source of wealth. We
undertake the same perspective but try to isolate possible effects induced by
asymmetry of effort when providing legitimacy to endowment. Decisions in
the experiment take place in a setting of strong anonymity and the experi-
mental design explicitly addresses the impact of alternative representations
of the counterpart with whom interacting as involved in a ponderous ac-
tivity or not (i.e., symmetry of effort). In more details, the recipients may
alternatively be involved in the same tiring task the dictator has been in-
volved or may be kept idle. At the best of our knowledge, the relevance of
a symmetric starting condition in terms of effort in the experiment has not
been explicitly addressed by previous contributions on the Dictator Game.
A lack of control about the impact of symmetric effort is likely to lead to
a biased assessment of the relevance of assets legitimacy and anonymity in
decision making.
2 Experimental Design
2.1 Procedures
The experiment has been based on a treatment-control design. Our control
condition replicates the double blind + earnings condition as reported by
Cherry et al. (2002). The factor under examination is symmetry in effort.
In the baseline condition only the Dictator in each Dictator-Recipient couple
works while in the treatment condition both the Dictator and the Recipient
are involved in the same ponderous task. Six independent sessions were per-
formed, with three sessions conducted under a baseline condition and three
sessions conducted under a treatment condition. Three sessions took place
on May, 17th 2006 and the other three on May, 24th 2006. The experiment
took place at the Faculty of Economics of the University of Trento, Italy. In
each session 35 subjects were recruited, 18 out the 29 subjects were told to
gather in front of a room (Room A) while the remaining 17 subjects were
told to gather at a different room (Room B). The two rooms are located
at different floors and this implies that the two subject pools did not meet
before the experiment. A Subject in Room A is identified in the paper as a
Subject A while a subject in Room B is identified in the paper as a Subject
B. The sample of participants was composed by students of different facul-
ties of the University of Trento, Italy. Two different stages can be identified
in the basic experimental setting. Subjects are informed about the second
stage of the experiment only after the conclusion of the first stage.
In the first stage, when the treatment implemented requires it, subjects
are asked to answer 17 questions taken from the sample section of the Grad-
4
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uate Management Admission Test (GMAT)2. Answering to more than 9
questions correctly will lead to an earning of 30 e while answering to less
than 10 questions in a correct way will lead to a winning of 8 e 3. The quiz
is a web-based test and automatic correction has been designed for ques-
tions with single answer (i.e., questions from 1 to 10). For questions with
a more articulated answering structure on-line correction was performed by
some collaborators4. In the treatment condition, when both Subjects A and
Subjects B are involved in the quiz, a monitor from each Room is randomly
chosen. The two monitors move to the other room before the quiz starts
and at the end of the quiz return to their original room to report the actual
participation of the other group to the task. After this the two monitors
receive the show-up and the minimum possible earning in the quiz (i.e., 8 e)
and are asked to leave the experiment. The presence of the monitor aims at
providing the same credibility reinforcement to the condition of symmetry
in effort and to the double-blind condition.
In the second stage a dictator game is played. Before starting the game
a supervisor is randomly picked from the pool of subjects in Room A. The
remaining 16 subjects are assigned to the role of Dictators while the 16
Subjects sitting in Room B are assigned to the role of Recipient. This
implies that for each session 16 choices are registered.
A show-up fee of 4 e is provided to each participant independently
from her performance in the quiz stage. The support of the distribution of
earnings spans over the range 4-34 e. The average duration of each session
was 90 minutes.
2.2 Treatments
The experiment evaluates the impact of symmetry in effort on decisions of
unilateral giving. In the baseline condition (i.e., Sy.0 in Section 3) only the
subjects in Room A take part the quiz. In the treatment condition (i.e.,
Sy.1 in Section 3) both Subjects in Room A and Subjects in Room B are
called to answer to the quiz. In order to provide adequate incentives to exert
effort in the first stage of the experiment an envelope revealing the actual
type of subjects in the room was open only after all subjects had completed
the quiz. When subjects in the room are of type A they play as dictators
and thus they receive the earned amount while in the opposite case (i.e.,
Room B) subjects play as recipients and do not get anything out of their
performance in the quiz. Bolton et al. (1998) notice that different wording
2The quiz we adopted is an Italian translation of the quiz adopted by Cherry et al.
(2002) which full text in English can be found in List and Cherry (2000).
3List and Cherry (2000) in a footnote report how different tasks than the quiz in pilot
experiments deliver similar results in terms of choices in the dictator game.
4the support of Staff at the Computable and Experimental Economics Laboratory
(CEEL) of the University of Trento is greatly acknowledged. In particular, Marco Tecilla
is acknowledged for writing the software needed to manage the experiment.
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employed in the instructions may affect outcome observed in the DG. In par-
ticular, they observe that framing the game as a decision to put money in an
envelope or as dividing a sum that as been allocated to the couple may lead
to different kinds of behavior. To improve control on possible subtle effects
due to alternative wording in the instructions one of the baseline conditions
was performed employing the standard expression used in standard dictator
games (Forsythe et al., 1994)5. Instead, in the standard baseline sessions an
expression similar to that employed by Cherry et al. (2002) in their earnings
+ double blind condition is adopted6. The two sentences are characterized
by a different meaning in terms of nominal entitlement of wealth that has
to be split by the Dictator.
All the sessions were conducted under a strong anonymity condition fol-
lowing the Double Blind 1 experimental procedure as reported by Hoffman et al.
(1996)7. Given that the smallest banknote in the Euro zone amounts to 5
e we had to rely on 1 e coins to endow decision makers with enough de-
grees of freedom in the space of choices. To allocate endowments and collect
decisions in an anonymous way instead of relying on envelopes we employed
small film roll case (from here called also coin-cases). To contain 30 pieces
of 1 e coins two cases were bounded using some tape. A relevant feature
of these cases is that they are uniform and opaque. Thus, it is not possible
to observe the content of a case from outside. In the baseline condition the
following procedure has been followed in the second stage of the experiment.
At a first stage one of the participants is randomly selected as the monitor
and asked to certify the regularity of the procedures implemented. After
this, subjects who earned 30 e are going to receive a case with 30 coins
inside. Those who earned 8 e are going to receive a case with 8 pieces of
1 e coins inside. A white tape identifies cases containing 30 e while a
black tape identifies cases containing 8 e . One of the subjects from the 30
e pool and one of the subjects from the 8 e sample are going to receive
a case containing a worthless object. This will assure full anonymity also
in the eventuality that all the dictators contemporaneously choose a corner
solution for their decision task (i.e., either all choose to offer zero or the
total endowment). Subjects are left 3 minutes to decide what kind of ac-
tion undertake. Subjects are then asked to move behind a large cardboard
box which assures their privacy. When behind the box they are allowed to
remove from the case and store in their pockets the coins they are going to
keep for themselves. After this operation has been performed the partici-
pants move towards the exit and deposit the case inside a box. The box has
5“The amount earned by Player A has been provisionally allocated to each pair. Player
A can propose how much of this each person is going to receive”.
6“Subject A is going to decide how much of her earnings she is going to receive and
how much of her earnings Player B is going to receive”.
7For details on the procedure followed in the baseline condition see enclosed instruc-
tions.
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only a small hole on its top and thus does not allow to detect the position
of the coins case from outside. Once all the dictators have performed this
operation the experimenter and the monitor bring the box containing the
coin cases to the room where subjects B are waiting. Boxes are randomly
distributed on a table. Subjects B are asked in turn to select one of the coin
boxes without touching it. The case selected is then opened by the monitor
and the content is registered by the experimenter on a sheet of paper. The
same operation is repeated for each participant. The same information is
provided to each participant, independently from her type.
3 Results
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
On Table 1 descriptive measures8 of behavior observed under different con-
ditions in the experiment are reported.
Table 1 about here
Data collected in the baseline condition were pooled irrespectively of the dif-
ferent wording employed (see section 2.2 for details). Indeed, no significant
difference between the observations in correspondence to the two conditions
was registered either relying on parametric and non-parametric tests9. With
reference to Table 110 what can be noticed is a tendency, evidenced both
by the mean and the median of the distribution, to offer more in the treat-
ment condition than in the baseline condition has been registered. This is
true both for subjects who obtained high earnings in the quiz stage and for
subjects who earned just 8 e. In the high earnings regime subjects give on
average 3.5% of their endowment in the baseline condition and 11.4% in the
treatment condition. In the low earnings condition subjects offer on average
5.1% of their endowment in the baseline and 17.9% in the treatment condi-
tion. The median value of the baseline distribution is 0 both for high and
low stakes while the median of the treatment condition is higher in the high
earnings regime (3 e vs. 1 e). The standard deviation in the high earn-
ings condition is higher than that in the low earnings. This is partly due
to the boundary imposed on choices by the two different budget constraints
associated to the two earnings conditions. A measure of Recipient’s beliefs
8Statistical analysis of experimental outcomes was performed relying on the system for
statistical computation and graphics R (R Development Core Team, 2005)
9Wilcoxon rank sum test, p-value = 0.734; t-test, p-value = 0.898
10In the baseline condition (i.e., asymmetry in effort or, in more compact terms, Sy.0) 41
observations are available while in the treatment condition 42 observations are registered
in the dataset. The difference is due to a problem in the software managing the quiz
session. This lead to the missing observation in the second stage (i.e., Dictator Game)
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is obtained by ranking choices of the recipients and considering the rela-
tionship between ranking and color of the case. If Recipients believed that
those who receive more (i.e., white cases) would give more they should firstly
choose all the white cases and then move to the black cases. Parametric and
non.parametric tests11 confirm that on average white cases are chosen earlier
than black cases. As confirmed by descriptive statistics reported in Table 1
and by parametric and non-parametric tests12 beliefs of the Recipients are
correct on average as players in the high earnings condition tend to give
more than the others.
3.2 Distribution Analysis
Figure 1 depicts the empirical cumulative distribution function (ECDF) of
offers under different treatment conditions and earning conditions.
Figure 1 about here
The figure highlights how the baseline condition is statistically domi-
nated by the treatment condition, both in the high stakes regime and in the
low stakes regime. Focusing on offers in line with standard economic bench-
mark (i.e., offers equal to 0) it can be observed from Figure 1 that 47.83%
of those who earned 8 e gave nothing in the treatment condition and 63.64
% gave nothing in the baseline condition. With reference to the high stakes
condition, observations in the baseline are quite similar to those in the low
stakes setting (i.e., 52.63% gives nothing) while only 21.05% of those who
earned 30 e offers nothing to the partner in the treatment condition13.
Table 2 reports the number of offers equal to 0 and different than zero,
irrespectively of the earning condition, in the baseline and in the treatment
condition.
Table 2 about here
The ratio between zero and non-zero offers is equal to 1.412 in the base-
line condition and equal to 0.555 in the treatment condition. A Fisher-exact
test provides support to the statistical significance of the difference between
the two ratios (p− value = 0.049)14.
11The average ranking for white cases is 7.136 while for black cases is 9.529. Concerning
the statistic difference between the two distributions: Wilcoxon rank sum test, p-value =
0.011; t-test, p-value = 0.009
12Wilcoxon rank sum test, p-value = 0.037; t-test, p-value = 0.015
13It is interesting to notice, in qualitative terms, that zero offers in our baseline are
higher than those reported by Forsythe et al. (1994) and by Hoffman et al. (1996) in
the Double Blind 1 treatment, with both contributions not entailing asset legitimacy, but
considerably lower than those collected in the double-blind with asset-legitimacy treatment
of Cherry et al. (2002).
14It must be noticed that when the two earning conditions are separately considered
the same test does not provide evidence of difference in the low stakes situation and only
low support to the difference (p− value = 0.091) when high stakes are considered
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The bimodal distribution of zero and non-zero offers provides only a
partial representation of behavior in the interaction strategy considered.
When focusing on the actual distribution of offers in the interaction setting,
parametric (i.e., t-test) and non-parametric (i.e., Mann-Whitney test) tests
of the hypothesis that, on average, offers in Sy.1 are greater than offers
in Sy.0 provide support to the hypothesis that a statistically significant
difference between the two distributions of choices is registered15.
4 Conclusions
Evidence collected in the experiment suggests that symmetry in effort pos-
itively affects choices in the Dictator Game. Higher offers are registered
when both the dictator and the recipients in a couple are involved in the
same task than when only the dictator works. Such an effect is registered
even if a full-anonymity condition is employed across all sessions. This re-
sult, while interesting per se´ deserves a brief discussion in the perspective
of previous contributions. In their work on the relation between asset legiti-
macy and other-regarding behavior, Cherry et al. (2002) notice that “Asset
origin combined with isolation closed a long-standing gap between standard
game theory and observation. When assets are legitimized with effort and
strategic concerns are controlled with isolation, altruism was the exception
and self-interest was the rule”[p. 1221]. The evidence collected in our ex-
periment questions the validity of this strong statement and highlights a
lack of control in the experimental setting presented by Cherry et al.. Asset
legitimacy may play an important role in unilateral giving but its impact
may be overestimated by an experimental design which does not account for
another very relevant issue implicitly embodied in the standard DG which
is the ”social reference point” assumed by the dictators as a benchmark for
evaluating the degree of fairness of their decisions. The gap Cherry et al.
refer to may have been closed not only by control on strategic concerns and
legitimacy of assets but also by the asymmetry in effort performed by par-
ticipants in their experiment. Dictators in the Cherry et al.’s setting knew
that their recipients ”had not the opportunity to earn money” and therefore
they knew that the recipients did not do anything else than gathering in
a room to wait for anonymous offers. As the introduction has highlighted,
different social factors are likely to affect offers in the DG. Different char-
acterizations of the interaction and of the counterpart seem to intervene in
the definition of the dictators’ relative social position. In the Cherry et al.’s
setting the social reference point suggested as a benchmark for the dictators
15t-test, p-value=0.001 ; Mann-Whitney test, p-value=0.001. The differences are statis-
tically significant also when the same hypothesis is separately tested on observations from
the low earnings condition (t-test, p-value=0.005 ; Mann-Whitney test, p-value=0.006)
and on observations from the high earnings condition (t-test, p-value= 0.012; Mann-
Whitney test, p-value=0.035)
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to evaluate the degree of fairness of their choices is the effort variable: a
dictator worked and thus earned while the counterpart did not work and
thus did not earn. It follows that in this perspective legitimacy is twofold:
assets are legitimate because they are supported by effort provision but, at
the same time, self-oriented behavior is legitimate by asymmetry in effort.
It is worth noticing that the impact of asymmetry in the status of the two
players in a DG has been already evidenced by Hoffman et al. (1994). When
the role and the pairing in the DG is defined according to a ranking based
on some skill measure, the dictators, who are higher in the ranking than
the recipients, tend to offer a lower amount than in a random assignment
setting.
Concerning the relevance of pseudo-reputation effects in simple bargain-
ing situations it should be noticed that in our experiment all the sessions
were performed under a full anonymity condition which mimics the one in-
troduced by Hoffman et al. (1994). Observing results from their experiment
the authors conclude that deviations from standard predictions are mainly
to be searched in a lack of control about social concerns. The increase in
offers registered in our treatment condition can hardly be reconciled with a
conclusion of this kind. What emerges from our experiment is that Double-
blind procedures may provide an important control in laboratory settings
but that the source of deviations from standard predictions cannot exclu-
sively be found in some sort of reputation effect. Finally, it is worth un-
derlining that the offers registered in our baseline condition are much lower
than those observed in the homologous treatment of Cherry et al. (2002).
The difference between the two set of observations deserves further attention
to assess the impact of experimental procedures and participant pool.
To summarize it can be noticed that, as already pointed out by pre-
vious contributions, effort of the counterpart matters when defining what
she deserves in a setting like the Dictator Game. In general, evidence here
presented suggests that characteristics of the recipient are relevant when in-
terpreting outcomes from simple bargaining situations and that this aspect
deserves further attention, both in a positive and in a normative perspective.
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A Figures and Tables
Table 1: Descriptive measures
Earnings N Mean Median Std dev
Sy.0 Sy.1 Sy.0 Sy.1 Sy.0 Sy.1 Sy.0 Sy.1
High 19.000 19.000 1.053 3.421 0.000 3.000 1.715 3.339
Low 22.000 23.000 0.409 1.435 0.000 1.000 0.590 1.973
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Figure1:CumulativeDistributionoftheDictator’schoices
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Table 2: Count of Zero/Non Zero Offers per Treatment
Sy.0 Sy.1
Zero 24 15
Non Zero 17 27
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B Instructions (Translation from Italian)
In this experiment you are going to be matched with another person.
Within the couple you will be identified as Subject . . . and the other
person is identified ad Subject . . .. The fact that you are a Subject A
or a Subject B is randomly defined.
Neither during the experiment nor after the experiment you will know
the identity of the person you are matched with. The same applies for
the person you are matched with. Moreover, it will not be possible to
associate your choices in the experiment with your identity.
In the room there are other participants to the experiment. Nobody
of them will be paired with you. Their choices will have no impact on
your situation and your choices will not affect their situation.
The experiment is structured as follows:
• One individual among participants of type A has been randomly cho-
sen as Monitor. The Monitor will supervise procedures in the experi-
ment and will follow instructions provided by the Experimenter. The
Experimenter will supervise the experimental procedures that will be
conducted by the Monitor.
• Player A has alternatively earned 8 e or 30 e according to her
performance in the previous session
* (Sy.0) Player B has not had the opportunity to earn any money
* (Sy.1) Player B has performed the same task Player B was involved
in. The attribution to role A or role B is purely random. Players B
to whom the choices of Players A refer did not receive any reward for
their effort.
• The Monitor will distribute some cases to the participants. Those
who earned 30 e will receive a white case. Those who earned 8 e will
receive a black case. No other label is attached to the case. One of the
Players who earned 8 e and one of the Players who earned 30 e is
going to randomly receive a case containing a worthless object.
* (Sy.0) Subject A is going to decide how much of her earnings she is
going to receive and how much of her earnings Player B is going to
receive
* (Sy.0.bis) The amount earned by Player A has been provisionally al-
located to each pair. Player A can propose how much of this each
person is going to receive
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• Participants will have 3 minutes to decide. After this, the Monitor will
call each subject in turn to move behind a large cardboard box. Here
Players have to remove from the case they received the amount they
want to keep for themselves and leave in the case the amount Player
B is going to receive
• Player A will close the case and will move towards the exit. The cases
must be open only once behind the box and must be closed carefully
when leaving the box. Players A who will receive the worthless and
publicly reveal the content of the case will not receive the participation
fee
• Player A will autonomously the case in a box near the exit and, after
having received the participation fee, will leave the room. The po-
sition of the case in the box will not be observable by people in the
room. Players who received the worthless object must follow the same
procedure
• The same procedure is repeated for each Player A in the room
• The Monitor takes the box and, together with the Experimenter,
brings it to Room B
• The Monitor calls a Player B. She has to choose, without touching it,
on of the cases on the desk.
• The Monitor opens the case and the content is registered by the Ex-
perimenter on a form. The content of the case is given to Player B
• The same procedure is repeated for each Player B in the room
• The Monitor receives her reward and the experiment ends
A bell will ring at the end of the 3 minutes you are left to choose. It
is not allowed to speak with the other participants during the experi-
ment.
Are there any questions?
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